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ATTORNEY FEES: SLIPPING FROM THE AMERICAN
RULE STRAIT JACKET
Erik B. Thueson
I. INTRODUCTION
Absent statute or enforceable contract to the contrary, Ameri-
can litigants pay their attorneys' fees.' This rule is contrary to the
English rule, prevalent in most foreign jurisdictions, which assesses
both parties' fees against the losing litigant. It is woodenly applied
in virtually all American jurisdictions, 2 primarily on the justifica-
tion that legitimate resort to the court system would be discouraged
if the litigant was confronted with the specter of paying his oppo-
nent's fees as well as his own.3 Litigants should not overlook, how-
ever, that both the legislatures and the courts have created excep-
tions to the general rule in certain situations where strict applica-
tion would create injustice or would deter honest litigation rather
than encourage it. This article reviews the court-created exceptions
and discusses their application and prospects for adoption in Mon-
tana.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW
Although the extent to which it is applied varies from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, the equitable power to shift the burden of attor-
neys' fees to other litigants is recognized by virtually all courts.
Rather than expressing a general equity power, however, the courts
have limited these exceptions to the general rule to certain catego-
ries of cases where they can fashion judicially manageable limits.
But the law involving these categories has not been static. The
courts continually have added exceptions and experimented with
the limits of existing concepts.
The Montana supreme court strictly has adhered to the Ameri-
can rule4 and has allowed fee-shifting only in isolated instances.
1. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1974); Vincent v.
Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977); Serrano v. Priest, 414 Cal. Rptr. 315,
569 P.2d 1303 (1977); Nikles v. Barnes, 153 Mont. 113, 454 P.2d 608 (1969).
2. Alaska allows attorneys' fees as an item of costs which is to be awarded the prevailing
litigant as a matter of course. Alaska Civ. Rule 82(a) (reasonable fees determined as a
percentage of the recovery).
3. See, e.g., Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 236 (1969) (Goldbert,
J., concurring). Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 792 (1966); Kuezel, The Attorney Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IowA L. REV.
75 (1963); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L. REV.
1216 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Bitney v. School Dist. No. 44, 167 Mont. 129, 535 P.2d 1273 (1975); Rose-
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There are some recent indications, however, that the court may be
amenable to adopting a broader approach.
Seven categories of exceptions to the American rule are dis-
cussed in this comment. Only three of these categories, however, are
bona fide exceptions in the sense that the costs of fees are shifted
to the losing litigant and are expenses directly associated with the
conduct of the litigation. These are: the "bad faith exception," in
which fees are awarded against a party who has acted in bad faith
during the course of the litigation; the "private attorney general
exception," in which the loser is assessed both parties' fees because
his opponent has vindicated an important social policy; and the
"exemplary damages exception," in which fees are considered an
element of punitive damages. In two other exceptions, the "common
fund" and "substantial benefit" doctrines, the attorneys' fees are
shared by all persons benefiting from the litigation rather than as-
sessed against the loser. In the remaining two categories, the
"compensatory damages" and "prior litigation" exceptions, the at-
torney' fees are actually compensatory damages rather than litiga-
tion- expenses.
A. Common Fund Doctrine
When a person through active litigation creates reserves or in-
creases a fund, others sharing in the fund must bear a portion of the
litigation costs including reasonable attorneys' fees.5 The fees can
be collected either from the fund itself or from those enjoying its
benefits. As such, they are not awarded against the losing party,
but are apportioned pro tanto against all who benefit from the liti-
gation.
The scope of the doctrine has evolved over the years. Early in
its development, the courts recognized that the attorney had an
neau Foods, Inc. v. Coleman, 140 Mont. 572, 374 P.2d 87 (1962); Tomten v. Thomas, 125
Mont. 159, 232 P.2d 723 (1955).
5. See Trustee v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). In this leading decision, a bond-
holder, through expensive litigation, managed to save a large amount of security pledged ior
paying interest on the bonds. This created a fund in which other bondholders shared. The
United States Supreme Court held that a court has discretion to use equitable power to allow
reimbursement of the successful litigant "either out of the fund itself or by proportional
contribution from those who accept the benefit of his efforts." Id. at 533.
For recent Ninth Circuit decisions, See City of Klawock v. Gustafson, 585 F.2d 428 (9th
Cir. 1978); Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977).
The doctrine has been recognized in Montana for over half a century. See Tuttle v.
Argonaut Ins. Co., - Mont. - , 580 P.2d 1379 (1978); Hardware Mut'l Cas. Co. v.
Buttler, 116 Mont. 73, 148 P.2d 563 (1944); In re Baxter's Estate, 94 Mont. 257, 22 P.2d 182
(1933).
6. See Trustee v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 533 (1881); State ex rel. Lewis and Clark
County v. Dist. Court, 90 Mont. 213, 224, 300 P. 544, 548 (1931).
1979] 309
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independent right, reinforceable by lien, to share in the entire fund,
although his client was only entitled to part of it.7 "The lawyer was
suddenly thought of as producer of this wealth, though he did noth-
ing more than perform his contract with his own client. "I Addition-
ally, the beneficiaries of the fund need not be parties to the proceed-
ings at all. "A fund may exist simply because a prior ruling will by
stare decisis, determine future cases." 9 On the other hand, the court
will not shift attorney fees where the lawyer merely represents an
adverse interest in the fund and his efforts only redistribute the
assets rather than protect or preserve them. Thus, where an attor-
ney's efforts merely establish which of conflicting claimants are
entitled to share in a decedent's estate, no fee will be awarded. 0
The concept is well-settled in virtually all American jurisdic-
tions, including the federal courts and Montana." It is frequently
applied in class action situations where the litigation results in an
easily calculable sum.'"
7. See, e.g., Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); accord, Vincent
v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.1977); In re Baxter's Estate, 94 Mont. 257,
22 P.2d 182 (1933).
8. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARv. L.
REv. 1597, 1603-04 (1974).
9. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) is often cited for this proposition.
The plaintiff successfully established her own rights in a trust, but had not brought her action
as a class suit. The rights of other beneficiaries, therefore, were not established. The litiga-
tion, through stare decisis, however, determined the outcome of future cases.
In the federal courts, district court judgments do not necessarily have the effect of stare
decisis. City of Klawock v. Gustafson, 585 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1978).
See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1609-11 (1974).
10. Hamilton's Estate v. Farguhar, 96 Mont. 551, 33 P.2d 258 (1934); accord, Gabrielson
v. City of Long Beach, 56 Cal. 2d 224, 363 P.2d 883, 14 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1961).
11. See note 5, supra.
12. State ex rel. Lewis and Clark County v. Dist. Court, 90 Mont. 213, 300 P. 544 (1931)
illustrates the class action situation. Bank depositors brought an action for themselves and
all others similarly situated to annul proceedings for capital stock reduction. The reduction
had reduced the amount available to creditors after the bank became insolvent. The deposi-
tor successfully annulled the proceeding resulting in the creation of a fund available to all
bank creditors. The court held that since the action had been maintained by the depositors
at considerable expense, the necessary expense, including a reasonable attorney's fee should
be fixed by the court and paid to the plaintiffs. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise
"would be wholly unconscionable." It would allow the great mass of creditors to "share in
the feast at the expense of the hunter who got the game." Id. at 224, 300 P. at 548. See also
Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1384 (1971). The following recent cases represent other situations where
the "common fund" doctrine has been applied. City of Klawock v. Gustafson, 585 F.2d 428
(9th Cir. 1978) (after litigation resulted in defendant trustee deeding vacant lots over to the
city beneficiary in accordance with federal statute, the court held the city's attorneys had an
equitable claim to a reasonable fee, and the vacant lots constituted a common fund to which
they could look for payment); Tuttle v. Argonaut Ins. Co., - Mont. - , 580 P.2d 1379
(1978) (workers' compensation insurer was not allowed to share in the settlement achieved
by insured's litigation against tortfeasor until proportional attorney fees were paid; court
noted that this requirement is now statutory for workers' compensation cases); Agee v. Trus-
3
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B. Substantial Benefit Doctrine
Attorney fees can be awarded "when a litigant, proceeding in a
representative capacity, obtains a decision resulting in the conferral
of a 'substantial benefit' of a pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature."' 3
The concept is actually an extension of the "common fund" doctrine
rather than an independent theory for allowing fee-shifting. Similar
to the "common fund" doctrine, it is based on the equitable consid-
eration that those receiving the benefit should contribute to the cost
of producing it.4 Unlike the "common benefit" doctrine, however,
there is no necessity for the court to be in possession of a fund or
for the benefit to be pecuniary in nature.
A common application is the stockholders' derivative suit. For
instance, in the seminal California case, shareholders gained a set-
tlement assuring a beneficial change in corporate management and
the arbitration of certain claims which could result in future mone-
tary awards. Although the action created no specific fund, the court
shifted the cost of fees from the shareholders who brought the suit
to the corporation which would ultimately benefit.'"
The several types of situations in which the substantial benefit
doctrine has been applied exhibit its expansion. For example, in
Hall v. Cole'" the United States Supreme Court applied a variation
of the doctrine when a labor union member brought suit against his
union for attempting to suppress his speech. Since vindication of the
former member's rights also substantially benefited the union and
all of its members, reimbursement of attorney fees from the union's
treasury merely shifted the costs of litigation to the "class that
[had] benefited from them.""
The concept is also applicable in suits against the government.
tees of Pension Bd., 33 Colo. App. 268, 518 P.2d 301 (1974) (firemen who successfully pre-
vented pension board from wrongfully paying pensions were entitled to fees for protecting the
pension fund - especially since the litigants received no direct personal benefit from prose-
cuting the action); Grein v. Cavano, 61 Wash. 2d 498, 379 P.2d 209 (1963) (union members
who successfully forced an accounting of union funds were entitled to attorney fees for benefit-
ing the fund). See also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds,
87 HARV. L. REV. f597 (1974).
13. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 1309, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (1977).
See also Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977).
14. Id.
15. Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968).
16. 412 U.S. 1 (1973). The plaintiff, after introducing several resolutions alleging instan-
ces of union officials' misconduct, was expelled from the union. He claimed in his suit that
his right of free speech, as protected by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976), had been violated.
17. Id. at 8-9. See also Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (stockholder
derivative action setting aside merger resulted in a substantial benefit to an ascertainable
class - other shareholders of the corporation).
1979]
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In Mandel v. Hodges,"5 a California court of appeal awarded attor-
ney fees to a state employee who successfully challenged the state's
practice of giving employees time off with pay on Good Friday. In
holding that the practice violated the constitutional prohibition
against the establishment of religion, the court found that a sub-
stantial benefit accrued to the state in the form of future savings of
funds formerly expended for work not performed.
Ordinarily, the benefits accrue to an identifiable class such as
a labor union, corporation, or government entity, but in Weiss v.
Bruno,'" the Washington Supreme Court extended the theory to
even broader classifications. A litigant who successfully blocked the
expenditure of public funds made pursuant to patently unconstitu-
tional legislation was awarded attorney fees because the action ben-
efited "all citizens and taxpayers by halting the disbursement, of
public funds."°The Montana Supreme Court has not directly ruled
on the applicability of the "substantial benefit" theory. Acceptance
of the concept by the United States Supreme Court," the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,12 and sister states, 3 however, pro-
vides important precedent. Additionally, in an early case the court
did recognize the concept, although it did not apply it,24 and it has
held that there is "no reason why the power of the court to allow an
attorney fee should be made to depend upon the mere possession of
[a] trust fund. 12 5 Finally, there is an additional important social
policy for adopting the doctrine, since without some form of fee-
shifting, large organizations can act oppressively toward their mem-
bers or constituency, knowing that their opposition will lack suffi-
cient financial resources to fight back.
C. Private Attorney General Concept
Attorney fees may be awarded a litigant who successfully vindi-
cates an important public policy if (1) the necessary costs of secur-
ing the result transcend the individual plaintiff's pecuniary interest
to an extent requiring subsidization, and (2) a substantial number
of persons stand to benefit from the decision. 6 At first blush, the
18. 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976).
19. 83 Wash. 2d 911, 523 P.2d 915 (1974).
20. Id. at 914, 523 P.2d at 917 (emphasis in original).
21. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
22. Vincent v. Hughes Air West, 557 F.2d 759, 768 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1977) (recognizing
doctring, but believing it should only apply where (1) the benefit is non-pecuniary, and (2)
the litigation involves interests of broad public importance).
23. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 1309, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (1977);
Weiss v. Bruno, 83 Wash. 2d 911, 523 P.2d 915 (1974).
24. MacGinniss v. Boston and Mont. Copper Co., 29 Mont. 397, 75 P. 89 (1904).
25. Id.
26. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326 (1977).
[Vol. 40
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concept appears to be a further extension of the "common fund"
doctrine, but it is premised on wholly different grounds. It is applied
solely to encourage suits effectuating important public policies
when the litigation would otherwise be financially impractical or
impossible." The court need not consider whether or not an identifi-
able class will ultimately share the financial burden of the litiga-
tion. Nor is it necessary to identify an actual or concrete benefit. It
is sufficient that a constitutional or important statutory policy is
redeemed. "8
The concept can provide needed assistance in two areas of liti-
gation. First, it certainly deserves recognition in financing public
interest suits. Complex issues and time-consuming, costly discovery
and presentation often limit the availability of representation by
private attorneys acting pro bono publico. Thus, as it stands now,
private and sometimes government entities can be lax with the
public's interests and can discount the possibility of a lawsuit be-
cause of the public's inability to mount or follow through with an
effective opposition. The court's exercise of equitable power to
award attorneys' fees to successful public interest litigants would
provide a means by which private citizens could surmount the fin-
ancial obstacles which now block litigation in the public interest."9
The concept also deserves attention in suits involving impor-
tant public policies brought on behalf of persons of moderate finana-
cial means. Representation for this type of litigant is often unavaila-
ble because a res adequate to pay an attorney through a contingency
fee arrangement is not generated. For instance, a citizen who has
his right of privacy violated will find that an inability to afford
attorney fees gives him a right without a remedy. The American rule
for allocating attorneys' fees under these circumstances loses all
justification since both the individual and society in general suffer
when constitutional rights go unvindicated. The tendency of the
rule to block access to the courts makes it an instrument of oppres-
sion. Exercising equity power to assure the members of the bar that
they can be compensated for their efforts - at least in conflicts of
constitutional significance - would provide the practical incentive
Accord, Application of Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 25 Or. App. 469, 550 P.2d 465 (1976); Crane
Towing, Inc. v. Gorton, 89 Wash.2d 161, 570 P.2d 428 (1977) (recognizing but not applying
theory); Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 57, 535 P.2d 541 (1975). Contra, Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1974); Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 416
R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976) (following reasoning of Alyeska).
27. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1977);
see Notes, Awarding Attorneys'Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light
to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973).
28. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1977).
29. The arguments for the concept are summarized in id., 569 P.2d at 1313, 141 Cal.
Rptr. at 1315.
1979] 313
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for the vigilance necessary to safeguard these important interests2
The "private attorney general" concept has developed in the
federal courts within the past decade. By 1974, all but one circuit
recognized its application.3' Unfortunately, in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,3 the United States Supreme
Court halted use of the doctrine in the federal courts - at least in
litigation concerning federal questions.3 3 The Court gave two pri-
mary reasons. First, the Court interpreted an 1853 court costs stat-
ute 34 as indicating a Congressional intent to preempt the field and
exlude attorneys' fee awards except in cases where a statutory grant
had been given.3 5 Secondly, the Court believed that the making of
such awards absent statutory grant would leave the courts "free to
fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance of attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party. . . or to pick and choose among plain-
tiffs and the statutes under which they sue and to award fees in
some cases but not in others, depending upon the courts' assessment
of the importance of the public policies involved in particular
cases.' 3
The Alyeska holding should not foreclose use of the doctrine in
state courts, however. The first case recognizing this distinction was
30. Most of the federal litigation concerned this type of situation. See Fowler v. Schwar-
zwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974) (action to enjoin discriminatory hiring practices where
the statute did not have express authorization for attorney fees); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219
(1st Cir. 1974) (prison inmates successfully enjoin deprivation of constitutional right by
prison officials); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) (vindication of
the federally protected right of interstate travel free from the forfeiture of welfare benefits).
In Knight v..Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972), the plaintiffs sued for unlawful discrimina-
tion in refusing to lease an apartment. They were awarded damages, but the trial court
refused to award attorney fees. In reversing the trial court on fees, the court of appeals
summarized the rationale for the "private attorney general" concept in this situation:
The violation of an important public policy may involve little by way of actual
damages, so far as a single individual is concerned, or little in comparison with the
cost of vindication, as the case at bar illustrates. If a defendant may feel that the
cost of litigation, and particularly, that the financial circumstances of an injured
party may mean that the chances of suit being brought, or continued in the face of
opposition, will be small, there will be little brake upon deliberate wrongdoing. In
such instances public policy may remove the burden from the shoulder of the
plaintiff seeking to vindicate the public right.
Id. at 853.
31. See Notes, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial
Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973).
32. 421 U.S. 240 (1974).
33. State law on attorney fees awards apparently will control in diversity suits. Id. at
259 n. 31.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1976).
35. 421 U.S. at 269.
36. Id. It should be mentioned that in 1976 Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fee Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which restored pre-Alyeska law to cases arising under
civil rights laws. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Serrano v. Priest7.3 In this California decision, a citizens' group suc-
cessfully challenged the constitutionality of the then-existing Cali-
fornia public school financing system. The plaintiffs' attorneys re-
quested an award of reasonable attorneys' fees against the defen-
dants (state of California officials) based on the equitable powers of
the court. After holding the "common fund" and "substantial bene-
fit" concepts inapplicable, the court addressed the "private attor-
ney general" theory. Concerning the Alyeska holding that Congress
had indicated an intent to preempt the field, the court noted that
the 1853 federal statute relied upon had no counterpart at the state
level. Moreover, it noted language in Aleyska, recognizing that "the
fashioning of equitable exceptions to the statutory rule to be applied
in [the states] is a matter within the sole competence of the
[state] court. ' 38 However, the court found the second basis of
Alyeska, dealing with the manageability and fairness of such awards
absent legislative guidance, to be directly in issue. It conceded that
thrusting the judge "into the rule of making assessments of the
relative strength or weakness of public policies . . . would [give
him a role] closely approaching that of the legislative function, '31
but it ruled that this difficulty was not present where, as in the case
before it, the public policy had constitutional rather than statutory
underpinnings. The award of attorney fees was therefore justified
since the plaintiffs had vindicated a constitutional policy which
benefited the citizens of the state, and the nature of the litigation
was such that subsidization was justified in the event of victory.
Similar to California, Oregon has recognized the applicability
of the private attorney general concept in situations involving the
protection of constitutional rights.40 Additionally, Michigan has in-
37. 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
38. 569 P.2d at 1313, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 324; see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975).
39. 141 Cal. Rptr. at 325, 569 P.2d 1314.
40. Application of Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 25 Or. App. 469, 550 P.2d 465 (1976); Deras
v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975). In Deras a candidate for state representative
successfully obtained declaratory relief that state statutes limiting funds which could be
spent on political campaigns were unconstitutional. The court said that "the plaintiff...
should not be required to bear the entire cost of this litigation the benefits of which flow
equally to all members of the public." Id. at 66, 535 P.2d at 550. The absence of an identifiable
benefited class and cost-spreading element indicates that the court implicitly recognized the
"private attorney general" concept although it did not refer to it by name. In Application of
Portland Gen. Elec. Co., the court stated that the Deras approach should only be employed
in cases of constitutional significance.
Apparently only one state has denied attorney fees on the basis of A lyeska. In Providence
Journal Co. v. Mason, 416 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976), the court held that the legislature
had indicated an intent to occupy the field. The case is distinguishable on the basis of the
right involved; it was based on statutory policy, rather than constitutional policy as were the
California and Oregon cases. It could be argued that allowance of attorney fees in some state
1979]
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corporated the concept into some of its statutes,4 as has California
subsequent to the Serrano decision." The American Bar Association
also supports fee-shifting in this type of situation."
The Montana court has not yet addressed this new equitable
concept. As discussed above, important policy grounds support its
adoption, and would be especially significant in Montana where the
constitution creates several substantive rights including "the right
to a clean and healthful environment" and an express right of pri-
vacy."
D. Bad Faith Concept
Attorneys' fees may be awarded the prevailing party where his
opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for op-
pressive reasons during the course of the litigation. 45 The award
generally is regarded as punitive and therefore will be considered
only in extraordinary circumstances where there is proved "bad
faith."'4 The existence of bad faith will not easily be concluded, and
it is generally only when the loser has "contumaciously deprived a
[person] of his clear legal entitlement, forcing the latter into the
statutes and not in others indicates a legislative intent to occupy the field. State statutes,
however, generally do not carefully regulate the remedy in detail when they create a substan-
tive right as federal statutes ordinarily do. Thus whether or not attorney fees should be
allowed is strictly a matter of statutory construction. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REmED ES 199 (1973).
41. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548(802) (1978) provides that in certain civil rights actions
the court may award attorney fees.
42. CAL. Cv. Poc. CODE § 1021.5 (West).
43. The ABA supports the principle that reasonable attorney fees be included as costs
recoverable by prevailing parties in more categories of civil litigation than present rules
permit. The organization has urged Congress to enact legislation to permit courts and admin-
istrative agencies to award fees from public funds when a private party substantially prevails
against the government if (1) substantial public benefit or important public rights are vindi-
cated and (2) the economic interest of the party is small. See Williams, Fee Shifting and
Public Interest Litigation, 64 A.B.A.J. 862 (1978).
44. MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 3 and 10 (privacy).
45. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). The concept apparently originated in the federal
courts. See F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116 (1974) (indicating that
this is a long recognized inherent power of the courts); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527
(1962). It has gained acceptance in the state courts, however. See, e.g., Christian v. American
Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978); Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 86 (1976). Some states now have statutes addressing this area. See Sinder v. Stevens
Kokes, Inc., __ Md. -, 384 A.2d 463 (1978) (applying Md. Rule 604b where plaintiffs
bring suit to harrass homebuilders); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. C & S Realty, 141 Ga.
216, 233 S.E.2d 9 (1977) (under GA. CODE § 20-1404 jury may award damages where a party
has acted in bad faith or stubbornly litigious). See Annot., 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833 (1977).
46. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Cordeco Development Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez,
539 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1976); Feist v. Luzerne County Bd. of Assessment, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct.
181, 347 A.2d 772, 781 (1975) ("the key factor . . . must be the proven bad faith of the
offending party").
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expense of rescuing himself through legal action," that attorney fees
will be awarded. 7
Vaughan v. Atkinson 8 is often cited to illustrate the concept.
A seaman brought an admiralty suit against a shipowner to recover
damages for failing to pay maintenance and medical costs asso-
ciated with suspected tuberculosis. The defendants had been
"callous in their attitude," making no investigation of the plaintiff's
claim." As a result, the seaman was forced to hire a lawyer and go
to court to recover what was "plainly" owed to him. The high court
held that the shipowner's "willful and persistent" default merited
fee-shifting.5
The requisite bad faith can occur in conduct leading to the
lawsuit or during the lawsuit itself. For instance, acceptance of the
concept has been triggered where conduct prior to the lawsuit in-
volved "gross and willful" fraud,5' where a corporation's oppressive
conduct substantially harmed another corporation through unfair
competition, 52 and where a labor union intentionally breached a
fiduciary duty owed a non-member.s Examples of conduct within
the lawsuit itself which have resulted in fee-shifting include the
filing of an unwarranted motion to hold an opponent in contempt
for failing to obey a court order,5 the vexatious seeking of a prelimi-
nary injunction without cause,ss and the use of dilatory actions de-
signed to protract litigation until the plaintiff is worn to financial
exhaustionM
47. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1978).
Accord, Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
48. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
49. Id. at 530.
50. Id. at 531.
51. Schlein v. Smith, 82 App.D.C. 42, 160 F.2d 22 (1947). The defendants swindled an
elderly woman out of her residential real property through a series of usurious transactions.
52. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Electric Concept, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1209, vacated on other
grounds, 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 405 U.S. 1017 (1970).
53. Richardson v. Comm. Workers of America, 530 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1977). The union intentionally breached its collective bargaining agree-
ment and wrongfully attempted to induce the plaintiff's discharge from employment.
54. E.g., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1974), citing
Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-428 (1923); Wisconsin Ave. Ass.
Inc. v. 2720 Wisc. Ave. Coop. Ass., Inc., 385 A.2d 20 (D.C. App. 1978).
55. In re Boston & Providence R.R. Corp., 501 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1974).
56. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S, 1, 15 (1972). "The dilatory action of the union and its officers
.. ."which contributed to nine years of delay before the plaintiff union member could finally
vindicate his rights justified fee-shifting as a punitive measure. A similar situation existed
in Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978). The insured was forced
to sue for disability benefits when the insurer denied liability. It became apparent during the
trial that the defendant never had a defense to the plaintiff's claim, but was merely trying
to force him into an unjustified settlement. The plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees if on
remand the trial court found "bad faith" on the part of the insurer.
1979] 317
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The grounds for adhering to the American rule in this situation
are not compelling. One of the primary justifications for requiring
litigants to pay their attorney fees is the fear that the risk of incur-
ring an opponent's unknown fees will discourage honest litigation.
This justification disappears where the losing party has pursued an
obviously spurious claim or defense.57
The bad faith concept is recognized in the federal courts and is
gaining recognition in state courts. The Montana court apparently
recognized it in Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros. 5 In this case, Home
Insurance Company paid a hospital for damages sustained when a
water boiler exploded. The insurance company then attempted to
become subrogated to the hospital's right to sue the architects who
designed the boiler. The architects' insurance company, an admit-
ted wholly owned subsidiary of Home, refused to defend against its
parent corporation. The trial court ultimately granted the architects
summary judgment and awarded attorneys' fees. On appeal, the
supreme court held that "[n]o right of subrogation can arise in
favor of an insurer against its own insured. ''"9 As to the attorneys'
fee award, the court said:
Home has been the moving party throughout this litigation and the
party whose wrongful acts made it necessary for the architects to
defend themselves .... Under such circumstances the wrongful
acts of the insurer (1) in suing its insured under its nonexistent
subrogation rights. . . and (2) its refusal to defend this action...
constituted breaches of its obligation and duty rendering the in-
surer liable for damages by way of attorney fees, expenses, and
court costs occasioned thereby. 0
Thus the court appears to have recognized that "bad faith" conduct
in the lawsuit itself can merit an attorney's fee award.
E. Compensatory Damages
Attorneys' fees can be awarded a prevailing litigant if incurred
as a foreseeable consequence of the wrongful act rather than as a
result solely of the litigation itself.0" The fees are actually true com-
pensatory damages rather than litigation costs. Included within the
scope of the rule are attorney fees incurred attempting to mitigate
damages, 2 and fees incurred while preparing to accept the fruits of
57. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES 198 (1973).
58. 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d 945 (1972).
59. Id. at 226, 500 P.2d at 449.
60. Id. at 227-28, 500 P.2d at 950.
61. Goggins v. Wright, 22 Ariz. App. 217, 526 P.2d 741 (1974) (fees connected with
quashing an invalid writ of execution); Davis v. Nat'l Pioneer Ins. Co., 515 P.2d 580 (Okla.
App. 1973).
62. First Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 62 Kan. 431, 63 P. 744 (1901).
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a contract (such as fees incurred by a purchaser hiring an attorney
to examine land title, and the seller breaches the contract).
The Montana court recognized this concept in Smith v. Fergus
County." The plaintiff successfully sued the defendant county for
breach of its real estate lease agreement. The court ruled that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover attorneys' fees incurred while
"attempting to get possession of the land covered by his contract"
prior to the litigation. The fees were considered "an element of
compensatory damages. . . to be treated as one of the legal conse-
quences of the original wrong."64
Additionally, a small minority of jurisdictions have allowed
litigation costs to be considered an item of compensatory damages
when the case merits the imposition of punitive damages, 5 but
Montana has not addressed this issue.
F. Prior Litigation with Third Parties
Attorneys' fees can be awarded when, as a foreseeable conse-
quence of the defendant's wrongful acts, the plaintiff is involved in
litigation with third parties. 6 Three elements are necessary: (1) the
defendant must have committed a wrongful act or omission; (2) the
act must expose and involve the plaintiff in litigation with a third
party; and (3) the third party must be a stranger to the initial
wrongful act or omission. 7 The original wrong may be a contract
violation or tortious act.6"
The concept is actually a particular application of the compen-
satory damages exception. A fairly common application arises
where an insurer has failed to defend its insured in an action
brought by a third party. In a subsequent action for breach of con-
tract in failing to defend, the insured may recover attorney fees
expended in defending the previous suit. 0
A unique application arose in California. The police arrested
the plaintiff for possessing a stolen handgun. The plaintiff subse-
quently brought an action for breach of warranty of title against the
63. 98 Mont. 377, 39 P.2d 193 (1934).
64. Id. at 384, 39 P.2d at 195.
65. See, e.g., Davis v. Tunison, 168 Ohio St. 471, 155 N.E.2d 904 (1959).
66. Chris/Rob Rlty. v. Chrysler Rlty. Corp., - Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 456 (1978);
Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wash. 915, 425 P.2d 891 (1967); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe,
409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969) (recognizing the Oklahoma rule).
67. Stolz v. McKowen, 14 Wash. App. 808, 545 P.2d 584 (1976). Accord, McNeil v.
Allen, 35 Col. App. 317, 534 P.2d 813 (1975).
68. See, e.g., Safeway Rentals & Sales Co., v. Albina Engine, Inc., 343 F.2d 129 (10th
Cir. 1972); Chris/Rob Rlty. v. Chrysler Rlty. Corp., - Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 456 (1978).
69. See section II(E), supra.
70. See Freed v. Travelers Ins., 300 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1962); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 270
(1965).
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dealer who sold him the gun. He was allowed to recover attorney fees
incurred in extricating himself from the criminal charges.7'
In Montana, Smith v. Fergus County ,72 which recognized attor-
ney fees as an element of compensatory damages, should provide
authority for this variation of the concept. Additionally, the Home
Ins. Co. case, although factually distinguishable, provides authority
that a "refusal to defend on behalf of . . . [the insured], consti-
tutes [breach] of . . . duty, rendering the insurer liable for dam-
ages by way of attorney fees."73
G. Exemplary Damages
A slight majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the
question have held that attorney fees may be awarded as an item
of damages in cases meriting exemplary damages.7" Most courts
consider the award an item of exemplary damages, but at least one
court holds that it is an item of compensatory damages." Two ra-
tionales have been advanced for allowing fee-shifting in this situa-
tion. One jurisdiction, Connecticut, holds that punitive awards are
"'punitive" in name only and are actually imposed to cover litigation
costs. 76 Other jurisdictions allow the award on the basis that a puni-
tive award also serves a compensatory purpose, including compen-
sation for costs subsequently incurred in the litigation. 7  Courts re-
fusing to recognize the concept consider punitive awards appropri-
ate only for punishment and example purposes. 8
The Montana court probably would not accept this concept,
since the court has never recognized a compensatory purpose in
punitive awards. 7 The policy argument could be made, however,
that a plaintiff should be encouraged to bring his dispute to court
since an element of the punitive award is "[t]he public good in the
restraint of others from wrongdoing." 0 Decreasing the plaintiff's
financial burden by shifting attorney fees to the wrongdoer certainly
would further this goal.
71. DeLaHoya v. Slim's Gun Shop, 80 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 8, 146 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1978).
72. 98 Mont. 377, 39 P.2d 193 (1934). See section II(E), supra.
73. 160 Mont. at 228, 500 P.2d at 950.
74. See Annot. 30 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1970).
75. Davis v. Tunison, 168 Ohio St. 471, 155 N.E.2d 904 (1959).
76. Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 222 A.2d 220 (1966).
77. See, e.g., Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972); Brewer v. Home
Stake Production Co., 200 Kan. 96, 434 P.2d 823 (1967).
78. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1970).
79. Ramsbacher v. Hohman, 80 Mont. 480, 489, 261 P. 273, 277 (1927); accord, Spack-
man v. Parsons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 414 P.2d 918 (1966).
80. Ramsbacher v. Hohman, 80 Mont. 480, 489, 261 P. 273, 277 (1927). Argument along
these lines was made in Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 691, 496 P.2d 682, 690 (1972).
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III. FEE-SHIFTING IN MONTANA
As the above discussion indicates, the Montana court is not a
stranger to exercising equity power to re-allocate the burdens of
attorneys' fees. The power has been recognized for at least seventy-
five years. 8' The court has frequently exercised the power in the
"common fund" situation, 2 but it often has shown signs that it
recognizes or would be predisposed to recognize the substantial ben-
efit,s3 bad faith,8 and compensatory damages 5 concepts. The ap-
proach, however, has been cautious and the court has never compre-
hensively defined the extent of its equitable power. By and large, it
has repeatedly asserted that "the general rule is that attorney fees
are not recoverable by successful litigants either in law or equity,
except where they are expressly provided by contract or statute." 8
In 1978, the court confronted the issue of non-statutory awards
of attorneys' fees on two occasions. In the first case, Foy v.
Anderson,87 the court indicated the existence of an inherent equity
power in the courts to ameliorate the American rule. The equity
power recognized appeared far broader than any previous decision
would indicate. Although the second case considered, Masonovich
v. School Dist. No. 1," severely limited the Foy holding, the two
cases still provide precedent for firmly establishing in Montana the
expanded approach recognized in other jurisdictions.
A. The 1978 Cases
In Foy, the defendant's automobile collided with an automobile
driven by Jo Ann Gilreath. Gilreath and one of her passengers,
Darby Fox, brought actions for personal injury. The defendant,
Anderson, then initiated a third-party declaratory judgment action
against his insurer for refusing to defend. He joined Karen Eggan,
another passenger of the Gilreath car, on the basis that she too had
asserted a claim against him. The trial court, however, dismissed
81. See Forrester v. Boston and Mont. Cooper Co., 29 Mont. 397, 407, 74 P. 1088, 1092
(1904).
82. See, e.g., Trustee v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 533 (1881); State ex rel. Lewis and
Clark County v. Dist. Court, 90 Mont. 213, 224, 330 P. 544, 548 (1931).
83. See Forrester v. Boston and Mont. Cooper Co., 29 Mont. 397, 74 P. 1088 (1904). See
also section II(B), supra.
84. See Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros., 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d 945 (1972). See also
section II(D), supra.
85. See Smith v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 377, 39 P.2d 193 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v.
Pinski Bros., 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d 945 (1972). See also section H(E), supra.
86. Bitney v. School District No. 44, 167 Mont. 129, 137, 535 P.2d 1273, 1277 (1975);
accord, McMahon v. Falls Mobile Home Center, Mont. - , 566 P.2d 75 (1977); Nikles
v. Barnes, 153 Mont. 113, 545 P.2d 608 (1969); Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461, 408 P.2d 487
(1965); Roseneau Foods, Inc. v. Coleman, 140 Mont. 572, 374 P.2d 87 (1962).
87. - Mont. -, 580 P.2d 114 (1978).
88. - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 1234 (1978).
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Eggan from the declaratory judgment action on the basis of her
affidavit that she never had contemplated an action against Ander-
son." The court also awarded Eggan $200 in attorney fees.
On appeal, the supreme court held that Eggan was not an indis-
pensible party and that she did not have a claim against Anderson
requiring her presence in the declaratory action. 0 They reasoned
that Anderson was seeking to compel Eggan to bring a lawsuit
against him and that this "violate[d] both the letter and the spirit
of the law" which were not designed to "encourage or promote litiga-
tion."" Addressing the attorney fee award, the court acknowledged
the general rule "that the prevailing party in an action is not enti-
tled to an award of attorney fees either as cost of the action or as
an element of damages."' 2 However, they went on to say that "it
must be remembered that the District Court has discretionary
power in dismissing an action . . .[and] [t]he court also reserves
the power to grant complete relief under its equity power.' 3 The
court's statement was "meant to establish no precedent, but [the
question of relief] must be determined on a case by case basis."' 4
Applying the facts, the court reasoned that Anderson "forced
[Eggan] through no fault on her part to incur attorney fees and
costs."'" If Eggan was not awarded fees, she would "not be made
whole or returned to the same position" she held prior to the suit. 6
Chief Justice Haswell dissented. He stated that the court's jus-
tification of making a prevailing party whole is equally "applicable
to any defendant who sues, hires an attorney, and ultimately pre-
vails."'" He viewed the case as a "sharp break from existing law"
and pondered why the court stated the case did not establish a
precedent. Finally, he acknowledged that there were substantial
arguments supporting awards to prevailing parties, but felt that this
was "a matter of public policy to be resolved by the legislature. '""8
Two months after Foy, the court decided Masonovich, in which
89. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Anderson presented an affidavit from an
insurance investigator indicating that Eggan's mother had told the investigator that they
intended to join the lawsuit. - Mont. at - , 580 P.2d at 115.
90. Arguably, Anderson may have been acting prudently in joining Eggan. The statute
provides that no declaratory judgment "shall prejudice the right of persons not parties to the
proceeding." MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 27-26-103 (1978)
(formerly codified at REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947],
§ 93-8911).
91. - Mont. at __, 580 P.2d at 116.
92. Id.
93. Id. (Emphasis added.)
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at -, 580 P.2d at 117.
98. Id.
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the prevailing party tested the broad rule handed down in Foy. The
plaintiff successfully enjoined a teachers' strike in Butte and was
awarded attorney fees of $1500 by the trial court. The supreme court
opinion, written by the dissenter in Foy, held that the trial judge
lacked the discretion to award the attorneys' fees." The court ruled
that the fees could not be allowed either as an item of costs or as
an award of damages. The fees were not allowable as costs since the
court had previously held that the items of costs listed in what is
now Montana Code Annotated § 25-10-201 (1978), 100 defining re-
coverable costs, was exclusive, and the list omitted attorney fees.'0 '
Moreover, the fees were not recoverable as damages since
"generally, there can be no recovery as damages of the expenses of
.. .attorney fees unless authorized by statute or contract."''0
The court next distinguished Foy. It stated that the Foy award
was not "damages," but was solely an award of attorney fees."' 0 3 It
then set forth some distinctions between the two situations:
This Court decided that due to the circumstances [in Foy], the
third party defendant was entitled to have her attorney fees paid
by the third party plaintiff, who had forced her to obtain an attor-
ney. In the instant case the plaintiffs position is entirely different
from the third party defendant's position in Foy.
Here, plaintiff obtained an attorney to institute legal action.
He did not obtain an attorney to help him defend against a claim
against him as in Foy. Plaintiff freely chose to obtain the services
of a private attorney to institute a suit against others. He was not
forced to take part in a legal action, which happened to the third
party defendant in Foy. Foy is distinguishable on this basis and is
not controlling in this case.'1'
B. Analysis
Chief Justice Haswell's criticisms of Foy in his dissenting opin-
ion and the limitations placed on that decision in Masonovich by
and large appear to be merited. The Foy approach, which on its face
endows a trial judge with vast discretion in awarding fees against
the loser, is inconsistent with the general approach that recognizes
only discrete categories of exceptions and is also inconsistent with
the cautious approach historically taken by the Montana court. The
99. - Mont. at -, 582 P.2d at 1236.
100. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 93-8618.
101. The opinion cited Roseneau Foods, Inc. v. Coleman, 140 Mont. 572, 374 P.2d 87
(1962).
102. - Mont. at -, 582 P.2d at 1235, citing 25 C.J.S. Damages § 50 (1966).
103. Id.
104. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 1236.
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absence of judically manageable limits allows the trial judge to act
in a role closely approaching a legislative function.' 5 This weakness
in Foy, however, does not completely destroy its value as precedent.
It should first be noted that the Masonovich case continues to
recognize that there are circumstances meriting the award of attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing party, although it clearly limits the trial
judge's discretion to make such awards. The Foy and Masonovich
cases provide authority for recognizing the exceptions adopted in
sister states but not yet firmly established in Montana. The empha-
sis in Foy on the losing litigant's conduct as an equitable factor in
fee-shifting reinforces the conclusion that the court did in fact recog-
nize the bad. faith concept in the previous case of Home Insurance
Co. v. Pinski.'" The continued recognition that strong equities can
merit shifting the burden of fees may indicate that the court will be
receptive to the private attorney general concept based on the pub-
lic policy of encouraging societally important litigation.
The classification given the Foy award in the Masonovich opin-
ion should also be noted. The court said the Foy award was neither
a recoverable cost nor an item of damages. Rather, it indicated that
attorneys' fees commanded a category of their own when awarded
because of compelling equities. 07 This novel concept will allow the
court to make future awards without violating the logic that attor-
ney fees cannot be awarded as a litigation cost or damage absent
contract or statutory provisions to the contrary.
Finally, the Foy ruling may hold the seeds of a new exception
to the American rule, notwithstanding the limits placed on it by
Masonovich. The award of attorney fees could be used to discourage
unnecessary litigation. The Foy and Masonovich cases indicate two
limitations on the doctrine. First, the trial judge would have to be
able to determine that the losing party "violate[d] both the letter
and spirit of the law," which was not designed to "encourage or
promote litigation. ''101 A finding that the loser acted in bad faith in
bringing suit, however, would not be necessary. Second, the court
would have to conclude that this conduct "forced [the opposing
party] to take part in a legal action."'" Further refinement of these
105. This was a major objection of the U.S. Supreme Court to recognition of the private
attorney general concept in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240
(1975).
106. 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d 945 (1972). See discussion in text accompanying notes 58-
60, supra.
107. Masonovich, - Mont. at -, 582 P.2d at 1236.
108. Foy, - Mont. at __, 580 P.2d at 116.
109. In Masonovich, the court stated that in Foy it had decided that due to the circum-
stances, the third-party defendant was entitled to have her attorney's fees paid by the third-
party plaintiff, who had forced her to obtain an attorney. - Mont. at _, 582 P.2d at
1236.
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elements will have to await common law development on a case-by-
case basis."10
Molding an exception to deter unnecessary litigation would
have an impact in situations far different from Foy v. Anderson. The
doctrine would discourage nuisance suits where actual bad faith in
bringing the action is difficult to prove. Under the American rule,
it is possible for a plaintiff to file a suit knowing that the potential
investigation costs and the accompanying attorneys' fees give the
case a settlement value regardless of the merits. Medical malprac-
tice suits seem particularly susceptible to this tactic. Although
other factors may prevent total elimination of this unjustified tac-
tic, the threat that the loser may be taxed with his opponent's
attorneys' fees would at least discourage its use."'
The bad faith concept is, in part, applicable to the problem of
misuse of the courts, but the requirement that factual bad faith be
proved prevents it from being a meaningful deterrent. The recent
Montana decisions could provide a foundation for an expanded ap-
proach if judicially manageable limits can be fashioned.
IV. CONCLUSION
American courts in general have shown a continuing willingness
to experiment with equitable methods of abrogating the harshness
of the American rule regarding payment of attorney fees. The com-
mon fund doctrine has been expanded by most courts to include the
substantial benefit theory, and has been extended by some courts
to the depth of its logical limits. The bad faith concept is recognized
throughout the federal system and is gaining recognition in the
states. Some courts that have faced the issue have concluded that
attorneys' fees incurred prior to litigation can be considered a legiti-
mate item of compensatory damages, and a growing number of
courts have recognized fees as an element of punitive damages.
Furthermore, the development of the "private attorney general"
theory within the last decade evidences a willingness by some courts
to use attorney fees as a method of furthering social policy.
Although its approach has often been guarded, the Montana
Supreme Court also recognizes an equitable power to redistribute
the costs of attorneys' fees in appropriate cases. Recent decisions
raise the possibility that the court will pursue the broader approach
110. In Foy, the court announced that its decision was "meant to establish no preced-
ent, but must be determined on a case by case basis." - Mont. at _ 580 P.2d at 116-
17.
111. See Kuezel, The Attorney Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IowA L. REv. 75,
78-80 (1963).
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taken by some sister states. The cases may even indicate a willing-
ness to go beyond the limits imposed elsewhere.
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